Voters express preferences through elections
Special interest groups provide additional information and advocacy for lawmaking
Politicians create laws reflecting voter and interest group preferences
Bureaucrats implement laws according to goals set by politicians
Judges interpret laws to settle individual disputes
What incentives does each type of player face?
How does this explain actual policy outcomes & behavior we see in the world?
Voters express preferences through elections
Voters as economic agents:
Choose: < a candidate/policy >
In order to maximize: < utility >
Subject to: < constraints? >
Citizens vote in politicians to enact various laws that citizens prefer — and vote politicians out of office if they fail to deliver
A collective action problem: citizens need to monitor the performance of politicians and bureaucrats to ensure government serves voters’ interests
Voting is instrumental in enacting voters’ preferences → policy
Good governance is a public good: an individual citizen enjoys a small fraction of benefit created
Additionally, policies & elections depend on many millions of people
Individual bears a private cost of informing self and participating
Hence, a free-rider problem
A rational individual will vote iff: p(B)+W>C
B: perceived net benefits of candidate (or policy) X over Y
p≈0
B is a public good
C>0
A rational individual will vote iff: p(B)+W>C
If citizens are purely rational, W=0
Citizens then vote if p(B)>C
Prediction: rational citizen does not vote
Year | Turnout of Elligible Voters |
---|---|
2020 | 62.0% |
2016 | 54.8% |
2012 | 53.8% |
2008 | 57.1% |
2004 | 55.7% |
2000 | 50.3% |
1996 | 49.0% |
1992 | 55.2% |
Sources: Wikipedia, U.S. Census Bureau, Bipartisan Policy Center
A rational individual will vote iff: p(B)+W>C
Now suppose, W>0
Citizens then vote if W>C
More importantly, the voter votes regardless of the positions of the candidates!
Vote for non-rational reasons: “more presidential looking,” “I’d have a beer with him,” “a better temperament,” etc.
Many do vote, even at significant personal cost!
“Expressive voting”: people vote to express identity, solidarity, tribalism, preferences, etc
Voting as a pure consumption good, not an instrumental investment to achieve policy preferences
Model predicts rational ignorance
Not necessarily no voting, but
Winston Churchill
1874-1965
“The best argument against democracy is a five minute conversation with the average voter.”
Somin, Ilya, 2014, Democracy and Political Ignorance
Somin, Ilya, 2014, Democracy and Political Ignorance
Just so we’re clear, rational ignorance is not a normative claim: that you should/not vote, or that you are a good/bad person if you do/don’t vote/vote rationally
It’s a positive explanation of the outcomes we see in the world
Suppose an expert judge is correct 90% of the time Pr(J=Wrong)=0.10
Suppose each individual juror, i, is just slightly better than random Pr(i=Wrong)=0.49
Suppose an expert judge is correct 90% of the time Pr(J=Wrong)=0.10
Suppose each individual juror, i, is just slightly better than random Pr(i=Wrong)=0.49
Pr(All i=Wrong)=12∏i=10.49=0.4912=0.0002
Pr(All i=wrong)<Pr(J=wrong)
Marquis of Condorcet
1743--1794
Suppose there is a correct outcome (e.g. innocent or guilty) and a group wishes to reach a decision by majority rule
Each voter has an independent probability pi of voting for the correct decision
How many voters should we include in the group?
M. Le Marquis de Condorcet, Essai Sur L'Application de L'Analyse a la Probabilite des Decisions Rendues a la pluralite des voix
Marquis of Condorcet
1743--1794
Condorcet Jury Theorem: if pi>0.50, then as n→∞, p(Correct)→1
Note: if pi<0.50, adding more voters decreases the probability of the correct outcome!
M. Le Marquis de Condorcet, Essai Sur L'Application de L'Analyse a la Probabilite des Decisions Rendues a la pluralite des voix
Applied to mass election:
Even if individual voters are rationally ignorant, individual votes on either side of optimum cancel out
Socially optimum policy remains at the median, and is thus, the winning policy enacted
Applied to mass election:
Even if individual voters are rationally ignorant, individual votes on either side of optimum cancel out
Socially optimum policy remains at the median, and is thus, the winning policy enacted
...so long as there are not systematic biases
People do have systematically biased beliefs?
Caplan:
Think about your own experience taking economics classes!
They probably have disabused you of some things you thought before taking them!
Bryan Caplan
1971-
Irrationality is a consumption good that protects our comforting beliefs from reality or scrutiny
Many biases are costly to indulge: anti-vaxx, faith healing, quack medicine, etc
Bryan Caplan
1971-
Caplan, Bryan, 2001, "Rational Ignorance versus Rational Irrationality," Kyklos 54: 3-26
Bryan Caplan
1971-
But in many areas (politics, religion, astrology), the "cost" of irrationality is zero!
Irrationality in politics: beliefs that are non-falsifiable, false, or biased
Voting often signals an identity and membership in a particular tribe (ideology, identity politics, etc)
Having your biases questioned is painful!!
Caplan, Bryan, 2007, The Myth of the Rational Voter
Choosing public preference often affected by Social desirability bias
People say and do things they don't believe because its what think others want to hear
Economists and your economics courses force you to fight a lot of social desirability bias:
"We should protect American workers from foreign competition"
"Given humanity's great tradition of exploration, do you favor continued funding for space flight?"
vs.
"In order to cut government waste and refocus our national priorities, should we fund things more important than space flight?"
Bryan Caplan
1971-
It's rational for individuals to maintain irrational (objectively wrong) beliefs about politics
Actual policies are not necessarily bad because of corruption, special interests, backroom deals, etc
Voters might be getting exactly what they want!
Caplan, Bryan, 2007, The Myth of the Rational Voter
H.L. Mencken
1880-1956
“Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard.”
Mencken, H. L, 1926, Notes on Democracy
Voters express preferences through elections
Special interest groups provide additional information and advocacy for lawmaking
Politicians create laws reflecting voter and interest group preferences
Bureaucrats implement laws according to goals set by politicians
Judges interpret laws to settle individual disputes
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Voters express preferences through elections
Special interest groups provide additional information and advocacy for lawmaking
Politicians create laws reflecting voter and interest group preferences
Bureaucrats implement laws according to goals set by politicians
Judges interpret laws to settle individual disputes
What incentives does each type of player face?
How does this explain actual policy outcomes & behavior we see in the world?
Voters express preferences through elections
Voters as economic agents:
Choose: < a candidate/policy >
In order to maximize: < utility >
Subject to: < constraints? >
Citizens vote in politicians to enact various laws that citizens prefer — and vote politicians out of office if they fail to deliver
A collective action problem: citizens need to monitor the performance of politicians and bureaucrats to ensure government serves voters’ interests
Voting is instrumental in enacting voters’ preferences → policy
Good governance is a public good: an individual citizen enjoys a small fraction of benefit created
Additionally, policies & elections depend on many millions of people
Individual bears a private cost of informing self and participating
Hence, a free-rider problem
A rational individual will vote iff: p(B)+W>C
B: perceived net benefits of candidate (or policy) X over Y
p≈0
B is a public good
C>0
A rational individual will vote iff: p(B)+W>C
If citizens are purely rational, W=0
Citizens then vote if p(B)>C
Prediction: rational citizen does not vote
Year | Turnout of Elligible Voters |
---|---|
2020 | 62.0% |
2016 | 54.8% |
2012 | 53.8% |
2008 | 57.1% |
2004 | 55.7% |
2000 | 50.3% |
1996 | 49.0% |
1992 | 55.2% |
Sources: Wikipedia, U.S. Census Bureau, Bipartisan Policy Center
A rational individual will vote iff: p(B)+W>C
Now suppose, W>0
Citizens then vote if W>C
More importantly, the voter votes regardless of the positions of the candidates!
Vote for non-rational reasons: “more presidential looking,” “I’d have a beer with him,” “a better temperament,” etc.
Many do vote, even at significant personal cost!
“Expressive voting”: people vote to express identity, solidarity, tribalism, preferences, etc
Voting as a pure consumption good, not an instrumental investment to achieve policy preferences
Model predicts rational ignorance
Not necessarily no voting, but
Winston Churchill
1874-1965
“The best argument against democracy is a five minute conversation with the average voter.”
Somin, Ilya, 2014, Democracy and Political Ignorance
Somin, Ilya, 2014, Democracy and Political Ignorance
Just so we’re clear, rational ignorance is not a normative claim: that you should/not vote, or that you are a good/bad person if you do/don’t vote/vote rationally
It’s a positive explanation of the outcomes we see in the world
Suppose an expert judge is correct 90% of the time Pr(J=Wrong)=0.10
Suppose each individual juror, i, is just slightly better than random Pr(i=Wrong)=0.49
Suppose an expert judge is correct 90% of the time Pr(J=Wrong)=0.10
Suppose each individual juror, i, is just slightly better than random Pr(i=Wrong)=0.49
Pr(All i=Wrong)=12∏i=10.49=0.4912=0.0002
Pr(All i=wrong)<Pr(J=wrong)
Marquis of Condorcet
1743--1794
Suppose there is a correct outcome (e.g. innocent or guilty) and a group wishes to reach a decision by majority rule
Each voter has an independent probability pi of voting for the correct decision
How many voters should we include in the group?
M. Le Marquis de Condorcet, Essai Sur L'Application de L'Analyse a la Probabilite des Decisions Rendues a la pluralite des voix
Marquis of Condorcet
1743--1794
Condorcet Jury Theorem: if pi>0.50, then as n→∞, p(Correct)→1
Note: if pi<0.50, adding more voters decreases the probability of the correct outcome!
M. Le Marquis de Condorcet, Essai Sur L'Application de L'Analyse a la Probabilite des Decisions Rendues a la pluralite des voix
Applied to mass election:
Even if individual voters are rationally ignorant, individual votes on either side of optimum cancel out
Socially optimum policy remains at the median, and is thus, the winning policy enacted
Applied to mass election:
Even if individual voters are rationally ignorant, individual votes on either side of optimum cancel out
Socially optimum policy remains at the median, and is thus, the winning policy enacted
...so long as there are not systematic biases
People do have systematically biased beliefs?
Caplan:
Think about your own experience taking economics classes!
They probably have disabused you of some things you thought before taking them!
Bryan Caplan
1971-
Irrationality is a consumption good that protects our comforting beliefs from reality or scrutiny
Many biases are costly to indulge: anti-vaxx, faith healing, quack medicine, etc
Bryan Caplan
1971-
Caplan, Bryan, 2001, "Rational Ignorance versus Rational Irrationality," Kyklos 54: 3-26
Bryan Caplan
1971-
But in many areas (politics, religion, astrology), the "cost" of irrationality is zero!
Irrationality in politics: beliefs that are non-falsifiable, false, or biased
Voting often signals an identity and membership in a particular tribe (ideology, identity politics, etc)
Having your biases questioned is painful!!
Caplan, Bryan, 2007, The Myth of the Rational Voter
Choosing public preference often affected by Social desirability bias
People say and do things they don't believe because its what think others want to hear
Economists and your economics courses force you to fight a lot of social desirability bias:
"We should protect American workers from foreign competition"
"Given humanity's great tradition of exploration, do you favor continued funding for space flight?"
vs.
"In order to cut government waste and refocus our national priorities, should we fund things more important than space flight?"
Bryan Caplan
1971-
It's rational for individuals to maintain irrational (objectively wrong) beliefs about politics
Actual policies are not necessarily bad because of corruption, special interests, backroom deals, etc
Voters might be getting exactly what they want!
Caplan, Bryan, 2007, The Myth of the Rational Voter
H.L. Mencken
1880-1956
“Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard.”
Mencken, H. L, 1926, Notes on Democracy