3.4 — Politicians

ECON 410 • Public Economics • Spring 2022 Ryan Safner

Assistant Professor of Economics

✓ <u>safner@hood.edu</u>


O<u>ryansafner/publicS22</u>

DublicS22.classes.ryansafner.com



Major Players in a Liberal Democracy

- Voters express preferences through elections
- **Special interest groups** provide additional information and advocacy for lawmaking
- **Politicians** create laws reflecting voter and interest group preferences
- **Bureaucrats** implement laws according to goals set by politicians
- Judges interpret laws to settle individual disputes



Politicians in a Liberal Democracy







Politicians in a Liberal Democracy



Politicians in a Liberal Democracy

- **Politicians** create laws reflecting voter and interest gorup preferences
- The politician's problem:
- 1. Choose: < a platform >
- 2. In order to maximize: < votes >
- 3. Subject to: < being re/elected >






How to Model Legislators and Legislation


- How do legislators choose which policies (or bills) to support?
 - $\circ~$ What voters want
 - $\circ~$ What special interests want
 - $\circ~$ What the politican honestly believes
- How do legislators interact with each other to produce policy?
- How do institutions affect legislative outcomes?







- Recall the Median Voter Theorem: politicians are trying to get close to what they believe the median voter wants
- Politicians may have their own honest convictions about issues
- Tradeoff: honest convictions vs. winning (adopting median voter's preferences)
 - Leslie Knope/Josiah Bartlet vs. Frank
 Underwood
 - Only winners get to enact their policies!








- Rationally ignorant voters pay little attention to actual substance or policymaking; more to TV-friendly spectacles
- Big speeches, ribbon cutting ceremonies, attack ads on rivals, etc
- Platforms more about broad platitudes than substance "family values," "tough on crime," "change," "drain the swamp" etc.

Politician's Incentives







The Industrial Organization of Congress

The Constitutional Framework

U.S. House of Representatives:

- Direct election of *all* representatives every 2 years
- All revenue (tax) bills must start in the House
- House votes for President in event of an electoral college tie, has power to impeach

The Constitutional Framework




U.S. House of Representatives:

- One rep. for each district (of 435), allocated to the 50 States according to population (decennial U.S. Census)
- The House at the time has the power to redraw districts
- Benefit of cleverly drawing districts: keep incumbent politicians from competing with one another!
- Like a market cartel: more profitable for firms to not compete with one another and agree to have exclusive territories

Gerrymandering: When Politicians Choose Voters





- "Gerrymandering": drawing districts for political benefits
- Has been used to both dilute and strengthen the power of political minorities
- Also used to create "safe seats" for incumbents

See U.S. Constitution, Article I


MA Governor Elbridge Gerry redrew districts in 1812 to benefit his party

Gerrymandering: When Politicians Choose Voters



Modern Gerrymanders

These newly drawn congressional districts are among the most contorted in the nation. In some places, their appendages are not much wider than a highway.



The Constitutional Framework




U.S. Senate:

- Each U.S. State gets 2 senators
- Originally appointed by State legislatures, 17th amendment (1913) changed to direct at-large election
- Each term is 6 years, and staggered elections so $\frac{1}{3}$ of the Senate is elected every 2 years
- President's federal appointments must obtain "advice and consent" of the Senate
- Votes to convict in impeachment trials

Recall: District Voting

- Election to Congress involves (1)
 aggregating individual votes in State
 (districts) and then (2) taking the
 majority vote of those districts
- Party winning most seats not necessarily the party that wins the most votes
- **Example**: in 2012, Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives earned 50.59% of the popular vote but only attained 46.21% of the seats

Party A Wins Legislature (2:1) Party B has More Votes (122:178)








More on District Voting

- For House races, each State is split into *n* districts, each electing their own rep.
 - Senate: State is one "at-large" district
- Suppose within a State $\frac{3}{4}$ of voters like Yellow party and $\frac{1}{4}$ like Green party
- Suppose the State has 4 districts, and each district elects a Member
 - State sends 3 Yellows, 1 Green to Congress

Four District State






More on District Voting

- Compare "At-Large" voting:
 - Yellow party candidate would win, goes to Senate
 - Minority parties do better under district voting than at-large voting



Four District State



The Geographic Distribution of Interests





- Each Member of Congress represents a geographic district (or State, for Senate)
- Special interests are often distributed geographically
 - Farming in rural areas
 - Flooding in coastal areas
 - Urban areas
 - Military bases

The Geographic Distribution of Interests





- The function of each Member is to benefit their district
- Voters & special interests with strong geographic concentration tend to flock to those legislators
- But how can a legislator get their constituents' agenda passed if they are just 1/435 (or 1/100)?



- e) **Coase Theorem** with osts and clearly defined
- Recall the (simple) **Coase Theorem** with low transaction costs and clearly defined property rights, parties can bargain to reach the socially efficient outcome
- Does a legislature bargain to reach the efficient outcome?





- Consider politics as a market for votes
- Imagine two groups:
 - $\circ~$ Group 1 prefers policy $A \succ B$
 - $\circ~$ Group 2 prefers policy $B \succ A$
- In theory, 1 can persuade 2 to support A in exchange for some side payment, i.e. 1 buys 2's vote



- That transaction would be a Pareto improvement! (Or at least, a Kaldor-Hicks improvement)
- Both groups are better off: 1 gets policy *A*, 2 is **compensated** by 1
- This is the **Coase theorem** in politics: parties can bargain to a socially efficient outcome
 - Like the doctor (or baker) paying off the baker (or doctor)



- However, in many cases in politics, this less likely to happen because of high transaction costs
- How would such a vote contract be enforceable?
 - No property rights in politics!
 - Public opinion could change between the votes
 - No way to credibly commit to upholding promise





• Easier for smaller groups with **low transaction costs**, like legislatures

Secret vs. Public Voting




- Votes in Congress are often publicly recorded
- This actually enhances the market for vote trading in Congress
 - provides verification that each side held up their end of the bargain
- **Secret ballots** raise transaction costs and prevent agreements or vote trades

 $\circ~$ no way to verify, easier to renege



Pork Barrel Legislation





- "Pork barrel" legislation: law that only benefits a narrow regional interest at taxpayer expense, solely for representative to bring money to their district
 - e.g. subsidies for "bridges to nowhere"
 - sometimes called "earmarks"
- This legislation would never pass as a bill on its own!

Park Barrel Legislation



Park Barrel Legislation







 One way these bills get enacted is logrolling or a quid-pro-quo: exchange of votes between legislators

> "You scratch my back, I'll scratch yours"

- **Example**: suppose you have a national Senate with 5 districts: A, B, C, D, E, each with 1 Senator
 - Voters in district A want a military base
 - $\circ~$ Voters in district B want a dam
 - $\circ~$ Voters in district C want a monument
 - Each must be paid for by country's taxpayers





| Senator | Base | Dam | Monument |
|---------|------|-----|----------|
| А | +10 | -3 | -3 |
| В | -3 | +10 | -3 |
| С | -3 | -3 | +10 |
| D | -3 | -3 | -3 |
| E | -3 | -3 | -3 |
| TOTAL | -2 | -2 | -2 |

- If each bill (A, B, C) was voted on separately For/Against, each would fail
 - A 4:1 majority against



| Senator | Base | Dam | Monument | COMBINED |
|---------|------|-----|----------|----------|
| А | +10 | -3 | -3 | +4 |
| В | -3 | +10 | -3 | +4 |
| С | -3 | -3 | +10 | +4 |
| D | -3 | -3 | -3 | -9 |
| E | -3 | -3 | -3 | -9 |
| TOTAL | -2 | -2 | -2 | -6 |

- If the three were combined in a single **omnibus bill**:
 - $\circ\,$ A, B, C form coalition to vote FOR
 - $\circ~$ D, E vote AGAINST

In General, Politics as Exchange



Congressional Committees



Congressional Committees






- Legislative agenda is a **commons**, easily congested!
- Committees create "property rights" to enclose portions of the agenda to exclusive committees

Congressional Committees




- Relevant committee must approve a bill to bring it to the full Congress to debate and vote
 - Most Committee members have similar interests
 - Easier for Committee to make amendments, attach "riders", that satisfy most members of Committee
 - i.e. easier logrolling to earmark
 money for each Member's district

Most Bills Die in Committee



Most Bills Die in Committee



Most Bills Die in Committee

