class: center, middle, inverse, title-slide # 4.3 — Corruption & Reform ## ECON 410 • Public Economics • Spring 2022 ### Ryan Safner<br> Assistant Professor of Economics <br> <a href="mailto:safner@hood.edu"><i class="fa fa-paper-plane fa-fw"></i>safner@hood.edu</a> <br> <a href="https://github.com/ryansafner/publicS22"><i class="fa fa-github fa-fw"></i>ryansafner/publicS22</a><br> <a href="https://publicS22.classes.ryansafner.com"> <i class="fa fa-globe fa-fw"></i>publicS22.classes.ryansafner.com</a><br> --- class: inverse ## [Refresher on Patronage and Rauch's Argument](#3) ## [Amateurs vs. Professionals in Politics](#13) ## [Polarization Around Issues](#23) ## [Political Realism](#35) ## [The Three-Pronged Attack of the Reformers](#39) --- class: inverse, center, middle # Refresher on Patronage and Rauch's Argument --- # Growing Democracy .center[  ] .source[Source: [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voter_turnout_in_the_United_States_presidential_elections#/media/File:U.S._Vote_for_President_as_Population_Share.png)] --- # Reminder: Patronage and Political Machines .pull-left[ - U.S. States and Federal Government was .hi[clientelist]¹, no *professional* bureaucracy until the Pendelton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 - Political parties delegated public offices to political allies - Cities governed by "political machines" - Vote buying, fraud, intimidation ] .pull-right[  ] .footnote[¹ Also called "patronage" or "the spoils system". ] --- # Reminder: Patronage and Political Machines .center[ <iframe width="980" height="550" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/OQ04YdyQPAc" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe> ] --- # Reminder: Patronage and Political Machines .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ George Washington Plunkitt 1842-1924 ] ] ] .right-column[ .smallest[ > "EVERYBODY is talkin' these days about Tammany men growin' rich on graft, but nobody thinks of drawin' the distinction between honest graft and dishonest graft. There's all the difference in the world between the two. Yes, many of our men have grown rich in politics. I have myself. I've made a big fortune out of the game, and I'm gettin' richer every day, but I've not gone in for dishonest graft—blackmailin' gamblers, saloonkeepers, disorderly people, etc.—and neither has any of the men who have made big fortunes in politics. > There's an honest graft, and I'm an example of how it works. I might sum up the whole thing by sayin': "I seen my opportunities and I took 'em." ] ] .source[[*Plunkitt of Tammany Hall*](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2810/2810-h/2810-h.htm#link2HCH0001), Ch. 1] --- # Reminder: Patronage and Political Machines .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ George Washington Plunkitt 1842-1924 ] ] ] .right-column[ .smallest[ "[Reformers] mean well but [they] don't know how to make distinctions. [They] can't see no difference between honest graft and dishonest graft and, consequent, [they get] things all mixed up. There's the biggest kind of a difference between political looters and politicians who make a fortune out of politics by keepin' their eyes wide open. The looter goes in for himself alone without considerin' his organization or his city. The politician looks after his own interests, the organization's interests, and the city's interests all at the same time. See the distinction? For instance, I ain't no looter. The looter hogs it. I never hogged. I made my pile in politics, but, at the same time, I served the organization and got more big improvements for New York City than any other livin' man. And I never monkeyed with the penal code." ] ] .source[[*Plunkitt of Tammany Hall*](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2810/2810-h/2810-h.htm#link2HCH0001), Ch. 7] --- # Rauch's Argument .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ Jonathan Rauch 1960- ] ] ] .right-column[ > "The politicos of our grandparents’ generation did a pretty good job of governing the country, despite living in a world of bosses and back rooms and unlimited donations, and many of them understood some home truths which today’s political reformers have too often overlooked or suppressed. In particular, they understood that transactional politics—the everyday give-and-take of dickering and compromise—is the essential work of governing and that government, and thus democracy, won’t work if leaders can’t make deals and make them stick," (pp.1-2). ] --- # Rauch's Argument .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ Jonathan Rauch 1960- ] ] ] .right-column[ .smallest[ > "[G]overnment cannot govern unless political machines or something like them exist and work, because machines are uniquely willing and able to negotiate compromises and make them stick. > "[P]rogressive, populist, and libertarian reformers joined forces to wage a decades-long war against machine politics by weakening political insiders' control of money, nominations, negotiations, and other essential tools of political leadership. > "[R]eformers' fixations on corruption and participation, although perhaps appropriate a long time ago, have become destabilizing and counterproductive, contributing to the rise of privatized psuedomachines that make governing more difficult and politics less accountable," (p.2). ] ] --- # Rauch's Argument .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ Jonathan Rauch 1960- ] ] ] .right-column[ .smallest[ > "[A]lthough no one wants to or could bring back the likes of Tammany Hall, much can be done to restore a more sensible balance by removing impediments which reforms have placed in the way of transactional politics and machine-building. > "[P]olitical realism, while coming in many flavors, is emerging as a coherent school of analysis and offers new directions for a reform conversation which has run aground on outdated and unrealistic assumptsion," (p.2) ] ] --- # Rauch's Argument .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ Jonathan Rauch 1960- ] ] ] .right-column[ > "Plunkitt remains relevant: he reminds us that governments, or at least well-functioning governments, rely not merely on formal legal mechanisms but also on informal political structures and intricate systems of incentives. No informal structures and incentives? No governance," (p.3). ] --- class: center, middle, inverse # Amateurs vs. Professionals in Politics --- # Amateurs vs. Professionals .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ James Q. Wilson 1931-2012 ] ] ] .right-column[ - Conflict between two groups in politics (*within each* political party!) 1. .hi-purple["Amateurs"] or .hi-purple["activists"] 2. .hi-purple["Professionals] or .hi-purple["the political class"] ("the deep State?") ] --- # Amateurs vs. Professionals .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ James Q. Wilson 1931-2012 ] ] ] .right-column[ > "A keen antipathy inevitably develops between the new and conventional politicians. The former accuse the latter of being at best 'hacks' and 'organization men' and at worst 'bosses' and 'machine leaders.' The latter retort by describing the former as 'dilettantes,' 'crackpots,' "outsiders,' and 'hypocritical do-gooders,'" (p.2). ] .source[Wilson, James Q, 1962, *The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities*] --- # The Role of Political Parties .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ James Q. Wilson 1931-2012 ] ] ] .right-column[ > "[Parties] recruit candidates, mobilize voters, and assemble power within the formal government...If legal power is badly fragmented among many independent elective officials and widely decentralized among many levels of government, the need for informal methods of assembling power becomes great...[A]ll three party functions will in some degree be performed differently by amateur as contrasted to professional politicians," (pp.16-17). ] .source[Wilson, James Q, 1962, *The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities*] --- # Amateurs vs. Professionals .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ James Q. Wilson 1931-2012 ] ] ] .right-column[ .smaller[ > "[The professional] is preoccupied with the outcome of politics in terms of winning or losing. Politics, to him, consists of concrete questions and specific persons who must be dealt with in a manner that will 'keep everybody happy' and thus minimize the possibility of defeat at the next election...Although he is not oblivious to the ends implied by political outcomes, he sees...the good of society as a by-product of efforts that are aimed, not at producing the good society, but at gaining power and place for one's self and one's party," (p.4). > "Issues will be avoided except in the most general terms or if the party is confident that a majority supports its position," (p.17). ] ] .source[Wilson, James Q, 1962, *The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities*] --- # Amateurs vs. Professionals .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ James Q. Wilson 1931-2012 ] ] ] .right-column[ > "The amateur asserts that principles, rather than interest, ought to be both the end and the motive of political action...[The amateur] sees each battle as a 'crisis,' and each victory as a triumph and each loss as a defeat for a cause," (p.4). > "Whereas professional politicians attempt to avoid issues because the loyalty of their workers is commanded by other means, amateurs generate issues because there seems to be no other way to command these loyalties," (p.160). ] .source[Wilson, James Q, 1962, *The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities*] --- # Amateurs vs. Professionals .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ James Q. Wilson 1931-2012 ] ] ] .right-column[ .smallest[ > "Most generally, the amateur believes that political parties ought to be programmatic, internally democratic, and largely or entirely free of a reliance on material incentives such as patronage. A programmatic party would offer a real policy alternative to the opposition party. A vote for the party would be as much, or more, a deliberate vote for a set of clear and specific proposals, linked by a common point of view or philosophy of government, as it would be for a vote for a set of leaders. The programmatic basis of one party would, to some extent, compel an expression of purpose by the opposing party and thus lead toward the realignment of both parties nationally, with liberals in one and conservatives in the other," (p.358). ] ] .source[Wilson, James Q, 1962, *The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities*] --- # Amateurs vs. Professionals .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ James Q. Wilson 1931-2012 ] ] ] .right-column[ > "The need to employ issues as incentives and to distinguish one party from the opposition along policy lines will mean that political conflict will be intensified, social cleavages will be exaggerated, party leaders will tend to be men skilled in the rhetorical arts, and the party's ability to produce agreement by trading issue-free resources will be reduced," (p.358). ] .source[Wilson, James Q, 1962, *The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities*] --- # Amateurs vs. Professionals .pull-left[ .center[  ] ] .pull-right[ - .hi[Professionals] are .hi-purple[repeat players] who work (in) the system for a living - build and maintain relationships with other politicians to get things done - focus more on making deals between various interest groups - realize the need to please enough of a majority to stay in power ] --- # Amateurs vs. Professionals .pull-left[ .center[  ] ] .pull-right[ - .hi[Amateurs/activists] are outsiders that care more about .hi-purple[issues], justice, purity, than deal-making - want more democratic parties and primary processes - have no way to keep relationships with others except by their commitment to the issue - will *manufacture* issues and crises to keep like-minded people loyal - see deal-making as "selling out", suspicious of compromise ] --- class: center, middle, inverse # Polarizing Around Issues --- # Polarizing Around Issues .pull-left[ .center[  ] ] .pull-right[ .smaller[ - Decades ago, many internal divisions within both the Republicans and Democratic parties on issues - conservative Democrats - liberal Republicans - Today, issues have clear Democrat-side vs. Republican-side - Politics becomes more ideological, meaning less compromise or deal-making - Results: less governing gets done, more gridlock ] ] --- # Polarizing Around Issues .center[  Source: [Pew Research Center (2014)](https://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/) ] --- # Polarizing Around Issues .center[  Source: [Pew Research Center (2014)](https://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/) ] --- # Polarizing Around Issues .center[  Source: [Pew Research Center (2014)](https://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/) ] --- # Polarizing Around Issues .center[  Source: [Facing History and Ourselves (2014)](https://www.facinghistory.org/educator-resources/current-events/explainer/political-polarization-united-states) ] --- # Polarizing Around Issues .center[ <iframe width="980" height="550" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/tEczkhfLwqM" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe> ] --- # Why Twitter is so Toxic .center[  ] .source[Brady, William J, Julian A Wills, et al., 2017, ["Emotion Shapes the Diffusion of Moralized Content in Social Networks"]((https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/114/28/7313.full.pdf) *PNAS* 114(28): 7313--7318] --- # Why Twitter is so Toxic .center[  ] .source[Brady, William J, Julian A Wills, et al., 2017, ["Emotion Shapes the Diffusion of Moralized Content in Social Networks"]((https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/114/28/7313.full.pdf) *PNAS* 114(28): 7313--7318] --- # Why Twitter is so Toxic .center[  ] .source[Brady, William J, Julian A Wills, et al., 2017, ["Emotion Shapes the Diffusion of Moralized Content in Social Networks"]((https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/114/28/7313.full.pdf) *PNAS* 114(28): 7313--7318] --- # Polarizing Around Issues .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ Jonathan Rauch 1960- ] ] ] .right-column[ > "[P]eople rightly perceive that politics is more contentious, more ideological, and less productive than in the past, and they are justifiably disgusted. Approval of government was higher, not lower, in the days when transactional politics was healthier, partly because government was seen as more competent," (p.14). ] --- # The Decline of Trust in Government .center[  ] .source[Source: [Pew Research Center (2015)](https://www.people-press.org/2015/11/23/1-trust-in-government-1958-2015/) ] --- class: inverse, center, middle # Political Realism --- # Political Realism .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ Jonathan Rauch 1960- ] ] ] .right-column[ > "Above all, the realist believes in the reality of trade-offs. We live in a world of second and often third choices, and in order to govern one must make decisions and engage in practices which look bad up close and are hard to defend in public but which, nonetheless, seem to be the best alternative at the time. Always, the realist asks: 'Compared with what?' Principles alone mean little until examined in the harsh light of real-world alternatives," (p.7). ] --- # Political Realism .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ Jonathan Rauch 1960- ] ] ] .right-column[ .smallest[ > "Back-scratching and logrolling are signs of a healthy political system, not a corrupt one. Transactional politics is not *always* appropriate or effective, but a political system which is not reliably capable of it is a system in a state of critical failure," (p.7). > "In politics, likewise, deal-making and balancing require both constitutional structures like legislatures and informal ones like parties and political networks...Ask her quietly, and a realist may acknowledge that, in any political system, the right amount of corruption is greater than zero, because a zero-tolerance approach criminalizes politics without actually ending corruption," (p.7). ] ] --- # Political Machines .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ Jonathan Rauch 1960- ] ] ] .right-column[ > "In order for governments to govern, political machines or something like them need to exist, and they need to work...By 'political machines,' I mean informal...and mutually accountable hierarchies, networks, and relationships that allow politicians to organize their environment by reaching accomodations, honoring accomodations, rewarding and protecting supporters, punishing and marginalizing defectors, and exerting coordinated influence through multiple formal channels8" (p.7). ] --- class: inverse, center, middle # The Three-Pronged Attack of the Reformers --- # Reformers: Progressives .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ Jonathan Rauch 1960- ] ] ] .right-column[ > "The *progressive* tradition scorns transactional politics for not being meritocratic. Where the realist tends to believe that governing is inherently difficult, that politics is inherently transactional, and that success is best judged in terms of reaching social accomodation rather than achieving some abstract purpose, the progressive tradition tends to see government as perfectible and politics as a path toward a higher public good...the progressive tradition tends to see [the public interest] as an abstract benchmark, against which real-world politics continually falls short" (p.15). ] --- # Reformers: Populists .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ Jonathan Rauch 1960- ] ] ] .right-column[ .smallest[ > "The *populist* tradition scorns transactional politics for deviating from democracy...While agreeing with progressivism that the leading problem in politics is corruption, the populist school equates legitimacy with direct participation by ordinary individuals and corruption with intermediation or influence on the part of organizations or interests, especially large or wealthy ones. For the populist reformer, the solution to almost any political problem involves more democracy, more participation, and more power for the little guy. Populism turns the progressive activist's instinctive suspicion of political insiders and careerists into an explicit ideology: by their very nature, political professionals are interlopers who speak for special interests and the political class; amateurs are the true custodians of the public interest" (p.16). ] ] --- # Reformers: Libertarians .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ Jonathan Rauch 1960- ] ] ] .right-column[ .smallest[ > "The third member...does not get along with the other two, except in one crucial respect: *libertarians* never saw a political machine that they liked. They, too, scorn transactional politics...because it deviates from market outcomes...[Libertarians] despise political machines less because they are machines than because they are political. If market decisions are, with rare exceptions, more just (because less arbitrary) and more efficient (because less economically distorting) than political decisions, then transactional politics is inherently unjust and wasteful-and thus corrupt," (p.17). ] ] --- # Reformers: Libertarians .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ Jonathan Rauch 1960- ] ] ] .right-column[ > "And so the libertarian and progressive critiques end up being twins separated at birth. Both are obsessed with corruption, see it everywhere, and are incapable of distinguishing it from policy disagreement; both view transactional politics as illegitimate...Only over the preferred prescription - more government or less, more regulation or more privatization - are they are daggers drawn," (p.18). ] --- # Reformers' Target: Political Parties' Primaries .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ Jonathan Rauch 1960- ] ] ] .right-column[ .smallest[ > "The crown jewel in the populist political reform movement is the political primary system. Once upon a time, the party's nomination to appear on a general election ballot was largely, though not entirely, in the gift of party elders and professionals, who may have fought with each other but could normally make their eventual choices stick," (p.18). > "A crucial premise of populist reform, namely that most people want to participate more in politics, turns out to be wrong. And so, instead of opening decisionmaking to a broader, more diverse, and more representative spectrum than party hacks represented, primaries have skewed decisionmaking toward the notably narrow, ideologically-extreme, and decidedly nonrepresentative sliver of voters who turn out in primary elections," (p.19). ] ] --- # Reformers' Target: Money in Politics .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ Jonathan Rauch 1960- ] ] ] .right-column[ .smallest[ > "[I]n the 1970s, [a second wave of progressive reformers] established a web of legalistic rules and regulations which have made it much harder for candidates and parties to raise money, on the general theory that fundraising and dependence on big-dollar donors are inherently corrupting. The result was not to reduce the amount of money in politics or to reduce the influence of special interests but to drive money to unrestricted channels, such as party committees. When progressive legislation restricted those channels too, the result was to push money into so-called 'independent' spending by super PACS, nonprofit organizations, billionaires, and other actors who are less accountable, less pragmatic, and less transparant than Tammany ever was," (p.19). ] ] --- # Reformers' Target: Smoke-Filled Rooms .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ Jonathan Rauch 1960- ] ] ] .right-column[ .smallest[ > "One important attribute of smoke-filled rooms was that usually you had a pretty good idea who was entiteld to be in them - and the selection, to the dismay of [progressives and populists], was not always based on merit. To the contrary, political leaders delegated deal-making to functionaries who had earned a place at the table by dint of seniority, loyalty, or cunning, as well as expertise. Keeping freelancers and interlopers out of the room and maintaining control over the agenda inside the room are instrumental to making bargaining manageable and delivering on deals; giving loyalists and time-servers a place at the table rewards them and marginalizes outsiders," (p.21-22). ] ] --- # Reformers' Target: Pork .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ Jonathan Rauch 1960- ] ] ] .right-column[ .smallest[ > "And then there are earmarks and pork. For years they were the hard currency of Capitol Hill's political economy. Sometimes abused, they could also be a powerful inducement to win a waivering vote or break an impasse. Lyndon Johnson famously won critical support for the 1964 Civil Rights Act by 'proposing, and personally securing, a NASA research facility at Purdue University,' in the district of House Republican leader Charles Halleck of Indiana. Pork remains alive but earmarks were banned in 2010 under pressue from Tea Partiers, who saw them as emblematic of Washington corruption...Their abolition stripped leaders on the Hill of one of the few tools still remaining to them for influencing behavior. Avoiding a government shutdown in 2013 would have 'absolutely' been easier if House Speaker Boehner had been able to dispense earmarks," (p.23). ] ]